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Abstract
This essay examines the context surrounding Thomas De Quincey’s
1846 essay, ‘System of the Heavens as Revealed by Lord Rosse’s
Telescope’, placing it in relation to the thesis of Robert Chambers’
then anonymous proto-evolutionary Vestiges of the Natural History of
Creation. I argue that De Quincey’s essay – which never mentions
Vestiges – can be read as an attempt to refute the ‘succession’ model of
evolution and development put forward by Chambers, and that it does
so by turning to Immanuel Kant’s ‘Phoenix of Nature’. The article
traces the complex relationship between De Quincey and Kant’s model
of the Heavens through a comprehensive analysis of both Kant and
astronomy in De Quincey’s voluminous body of work, complicating
our understanding of De Quincey’s relationship to the ‘destroyer’ of
Ko¨nigsberg, and revealing the crisis of experience that emerged in
De Quincey’s engagement with Kant and the Heavens.
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Thomas De Quincey’s essay of September 1846, ‘System of the Heavens
as Revealed by Lord Rosse’s Telescope’, has long been seen as one of
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his most unusual. An ostensible review of Thoughts on Some Important
Points Relating to the System of the World written by the University of
Glasgow Professor of Astronomy and good friend, John Pringle Nichol
(1846), it contains scant information on Nichol’s book, and the true
object of the essay is difficult to pin down. On one level, it is a work of
speculative philosophy that is concerned with the particular problems
of Kantian metaphysics; on another, it is a whimsical account of
the Glasgow Observatory, a translation of Jean Paul Richter, and
much else besides. For John Barrell, its famous description of the
Nebula of Orion is the most ‘disturbing instance of double vision’
in De Quincey’s writing, testament to the psychological trauma that
haunted De Quincey’s work (Barrell 105). It has also been noted
by Jonathan Smith and Robert Platzner as providing an exemplary
instance of De Quincey’s engagement with Astronomy and Kant
respectively. While De Quincey is not known for being either a
thorough or systematic thinker, I would like to extend Platzner’s and
Smith’s work by tracing two notable absences from the essay. The first,
given the time of publication, is the most glaring: no explicit reference
to Robert Chambers’ then anonymous Vestiges of the Natural History of
Creation (1844). The second is less notable, but hardly less important:
the absence in the published version of direct reference to Kant’s
relatively obscure work of 1755, Allgemeine Natter geschickte und Theorie
des Himmels, Universal History of Nature and Theory of the Heavens. There is
evidence that De Quincey was familiar with both works, yet neither
appear here. In tracing the absence of both texts, an absence filled
with meaning, I will sketch the larger question of De Quincey’s
relationship to Kant and to scientific knowledge, mapping out the
consequences for De Quincey of transcendental idealism which
illuminates the ‘System of the Heavens’. In the horror of gazing on
the Nebular of Orion, De Quincey sees the logic of Kant’s critical
project writ large, and, with it, a crisis of both religious faith and of
the subject. In tracing the figure of the ‘phoenix of nature’ I argue that
De Quincey’s attempt to reject models of ‘evolutionary’ theory – in
particular the logic of succession such as Chambers’ –, leads him back
to endorsing Kant’s early work on Newtonian physics.
De Quincey and Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation
Victorian Science has increasingly become an important sub-field in
the study of Victorian literature, with many critics paying attention
to the ways in which developments in natural history in particular
can be read through many canonical writers of the day (Hardy,
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Eliot, Tennyson). The attention, particularly over the past few years,
has understandably centred on Darwin and his associates. However,
James A. Secord’s Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication,
Reception and Secret Authorship of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,
has expanded our knowledge of those pre-Darwinian debates
over evolution, presenting the publication and reception of Robert
Chambers’ book as a major intellectual event of the period. With its
compelling narrative of human evolution and accessible summarising
of complex scientific material, it was read widely amongst the
intellectual upper middle classes and the lower middle classes
throughout the Victorian period. Approximately 30,000 copies were
sold in twelve editions between its initial publication in October 1844,
and the edition of 1884 revealed Chambers as the author. Many of
the great literary and intellectual figures of the day, such as Tennyson,
Disraeli, Abraham Lincoln and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, record in
private correspondence the sensation and confusion that its
publication caused as the implications of its insights became apparent.
De Quincey certainly knew Robert Chambers, the author of
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, although there is some
uncertainty as to the extent of their acquaintance. They were both
close friends of J.P. Nichol, one of the few people to whom Chambers
openly acknowledged he was the author (Secord 466–7). David Masson
lists Robert Chambers as one of De Quincey’s regular visitors in his
later years, and there is a reference to De Quincey in Chambers’ edited
miscellany, A Book of Days (Massson 24; Chambers 671). Moreover,
through James A. Secord’s research we have a clear picture of the
extent to which debates over the book saturated literary circles in
the 1840s, and it would seem impossible that De Quincey, as an active
member of Edinburgh’s literary class, would not have read it, or at least
accounts of it in the press, as well as been privy to the open secret
of Chamber’s authorship. For instance, a review of Explanations,
Chambers’ defence of Vestiges, was published in the same February
1846 edition of Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine as De Quincey’s ‘The
Antigone of Sophocles’. So, if we can speculate that De Quincey had
read Vestiges, or at least knew of its major thesis, why did he not
mention it in his review of Nichol written only two years after its
publication? This is of course an unanswerable question, yet in
what follows I would like to identify some uncanny echoes between
‘System’ and Vestiges, along with its ‘defence’ Explanations, published in
December 1845. My contention is that, in covering exactly the same
ground (the nebular hypotheses and its recent refutation through the
discoveries revealed by Lord Rosse’s telescope), we can map an esoteric
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critique of the logic underpinning Chambers’ book in De Quincey’s
essay. Moreover, it will lay the foundations for a more considered
understanding of De Quincey’s shifting response to Kant’s Cosmology
and the terror produced by Lord Rosse’s telescope.
Chambers’ book is an attempt to marry the natural sciences with
the history of creation. At each point in the narrative, a speculation
on the idea of creation is married with the latest observation in science.
The result is a plausible attempt to draw on contemporary science
to produce a narrative of all life in the universe. From astronomy,
through geology, biology, anthropology, and theology, Chambers
synthesises evidence to provide a model for the law of development.
The attempt to unite disparate disciplines of empirical observation
together under one speculative idea led to a great deal of hostility. The
most obvious criticism, and the greatest danger of Chambers’ method,
was that it called into question the story of Genesis. Yet Chambers
attempts to side-step this by suggesting he was trying to ‘give the true
view of the history of nature, with as little disturbance as possible to
existing beliefs’, and to remind the reader that, for instance, ‘Geology
at first seems inconsistent with the authority of the Mosaic record’,
but, in time, will become reconciled to it (Vestiges 388–9). De Quincey
rejects such a claim in ‘System of the Heavens’: ‘the Mosaic
cosmogony, indeed, gibes the succession of natural births; and that
succession will be more and more confirmed and illustrated as geology
advances’ (Works XV, 420). Yet the claims of Chambers struggle to
map onto the temporal claims of Genesis, and De Quincey suggests
that there is no way in which the scriptures should ‘condescend to
human curiosity’ (Works XV, 420). Any attempt to reconcile the time of
revelation with the successive time of the material world was futile.
It was, however, not the theological terrain on which De Quincey
was to attack the evolutionary model of revelation, but on the
very scientific grounds of its use of astronomy. Chambers’ Vestiges
begins with an account of the nebular hypotheses developed by the
Hershchels, who had argued that the nebulae were formed of gassy
liquids: ‘they have found within the limits of our astral system, and
generally in its outer fields, a great number of objects which, from their
foggy appearance, are called nebulae; some of vast and irregular
figure, as that in the sword of Orion, which is visible to the naked eye’
(7–8). The theory stated that the solar system was once incandescent
gas that cooled into rings and broke off to form planets. These objects
of ‘foggy appearance’ were then nebulae that were cooling and
condensing into planets, yet, if they could be viewed properly, would
be shown not to be gasses but objects in a process of contraction.
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These nebulae, if proven to exist, demonstrate that the universe is
not composed of static objects, but is instead in a process of evolution
as the nebulae gathered together to form solar systems and planets
beyond our own. The inference of this, of course, would be that
the narrative of Divine Creation was impossible and that the Universe
modulated and shifted according to its own natural process of
creation.
The nebular hypothesis, central for Chambers in Vestiges in 1844,
was called into question once the observations of Lord Rosse’s telescope
had been taken into account. Rosse’s extraordinarily powerful
telescope, otherwise known as the Leviathan of Parsonstown, began,
in February 1845, to examine the nebulae in more detail than ever
before. In an experiment of December 1845, the telescope resolved the
nebulae, proving that, when observed fully, it did not contract into
objects but remained as gas. The inference, therefore, was that the
universe did not in actuality follow its own rules, but was underpinned
by some sort of chaos, and that it was infinite in both time and
space. In short, Rosse’s telescope had managed to call into question
the Newtonian mechanistic view of cosmology that suggested it had to
work towards certain a priori principles. De Quincey was, however,
rebuked by J.P. Nichol for having misunderstood Thoughts Relating to the
System of the World, the subject of the essay. Indeed, as Jonathan Smith
has noted, De Quincey’s infamous anthropomorphised description of
the Orion Nebular was made from a plate by Sir John Herschel included
in Nichol’s earlier book,Views of the Architecture of the Heavens, and not
from any observations made through Lord Rosse’s telescope
(Smith 205). In fact, even a brief examination of the sketches in
Thoughts Relating to the System of the World show them in a clear state of
resolution and not contraction(Nichol Thoughts, 20; 21). It seems
De Quincey maintained that image for a certain effect of terror at the
mysteries of the infinity of space that become the central theme of the
essay.
If Nichol’s Thoughts and Lord Rosse’s telescope had ‘smashed’
the Nebulae Hypothesis, they had called into question the empirical
observations that had been used to shore up Chamber’s book. Most
importantly, a scientific rejection of the first section, ‘The Bodies
of Space’, had dinted the mechanistic logic that underpinned the
book. Chambers wanted to outline the limits of a system – from the
cosmological to the subjective – and if one part of it fell apart, the rest
must inevitably follow. The attempt to narrativise a mechanistic,
scientific view of the world had made it necessarily linear. However, if
the opening of the story could be demonstrated as false, it would
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undermine the entire account. Safe in the destruction of the scientific
basis for the Nebulae Hypothesis, De Quincey can also turn to attack
any philosophical or theological authority that one could imbue into
that system. His basic contention in the final section of ‘System’ is that
there is a philosophical error in granting a revelatory power to
astronomy or geology. The only form of revelation from the heavens is
the ‘special light’ that enables man to reveal what would otherwise
‘remain sealed in darkness’ (Works XV, 420). Astronomy and Geology
are therefore confusing human experience with transcendental
knowledge, that knowledge of ‘true religion’ which is not of this
world. The attempt to posit a priori forms of knowledge to be
confirmed by experience is to denigrate both. Yet, as we shall see
below, De Quincey was well aware that the philosophical logic of Kant
had hardly been ‘smashed’ by the proofs of Lord Rosse’s telescope. In
what follows, I highlight another, more unspeakable terror that lies at
the heart of the essay; the terror of Kant’s critical project being
realised. The Nebular Hypothesis is not really what is at stake in De
Quincey’s essay, or not in the way it may appear. While it may seem as if
De Quincey was taking some sort of glee in the refutation of the
mechanic La Placean view of the Universe, he was instead troubled by
something far more profound, that of the idea of the universe as a
phoenix. The chaos that exists at the outer edges of the universe, the
infinite reaches of time and space, do not, as De Quincey knows, wholly
refute the mechanistic image of the universe, but instead endorse it. In
rejecting the logic of the astronomical and geological bases for a
model of successive time, De Quincey had forced himself to adhere to
the Kantian model of the phoenix of nature, a different, yet still
mechanistic vision of the universe that he would earlier support, but
later attempt to refute.
De Quincey and Kant
De Quincey’s relation to Kant has always been a contested topic for
critics. He was originally enamoured with Kantian idealism, but
gradually began to develop more and more antipathy to it, before
returning to praise elements of Kantian morality close to his death. His
works from the 1820s demonstrate a commitment to having Kant’s
work properly received in England. Those essays in the Westmoreland
Gazette are almost wholly supportive of Kant’s work, while ‘Letters to a
Young Man Whose Education has Been Neglected’ (1823) attempts to
rectify the misreading of Kant in English, with De Quincey stating:
‘I should liberate the name and reputation of Kantean [sic] philosophy
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from any delusions which may collect about its purposes and
pretensions, through the representation of those who have spoken it
amongst ourselves’ (Works III, 86). De Quincey’s mission to rescue
Kant from poor interpretation has, however, not been met with
general appreciation by those who have evaluated De Quincey’s role as
an importer and champion of Kant’s work in England. Rosemary
Ashton, for instance, has suggested that De Quincey, in particular
when contrasted to Coleridge, ‘remained vague and ill-informed about
Kant’ (Ashton 42). Ashton is here repeating a critical commonplace
that had developed over the course of the twentieth century. The
main proponent was Rene´ Wellek, the Czech-American scholar, whose
corrosive analysis of De Quincey in Kant in England (1931) has proved
dominant. In it, he suggests that De Quincey’s Kant was confused, with
moments of accurate insight, others of staggering ignorance. In ten
pages, Wellek provides a portrait of De Quincey as the opportunistic
reader, not a philosopher. As he states: ‘De Quincey is one of the few
writers who claim a personal experience with Kant. But this experience
was based on a gross misunderstanding of the purpose of Kantian
philosophy and even if we could grant the right to misunderstand
Kant, we feel that this experience, however actual and indisputable,
remained only skin-deep, the expression of a mood, of a moment’s
despair and tedium’ (Wellek 181). It has been difficult to rescue
De Quincey’s Kant from this scathing attack, but Grevel Lindop has
argued that the relationship was far more nuanced, and that
De Quincey had begun very much enamoured with Kant’s system of
thought, before ultimately rejecting it as ‘the idea that space and time,
causation, even logic itself might all be properties of human
consciousness with no basis in external reality was one which he
found terrifying to confront’(Lindop 132). In more recent studies,
such as Paul Youngquist’s, there has been a move to understand
the relation in a more complex fashion by tracing a dialogue with
Kant beyond the small number of explicit references. Youngquist’s re-
reading of The Confessions through De Quincey’s embodied
understanding of health and digestion has opened up the material
De Quincey of bodily experience as a response to the ‘Kantian analytics
of the beautiful and sublime’(Youngquist 119). De Quincey’s own
misreading of Kant’s accuracy have also been explored by Daniel Sanjiv
Roberts, extending our understanding of the ways in which
De Quincey appropriates Kant. The general critical account seems to
be that De Quincey found a problem with the Kantian distinction
between a priori knowledge and a posteriori experience, and chose to
reject consciousness that wasn’t intrinsically tied to human experience.
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Many of De Quincey’s crises of experience are products of the attempt
to move through the philosophical and subjective implications of
this shift, his attempt to retain experience once having rejected
transcendental reason (not the transcendent truth of revelation), yet
still feeling its after-effects.
De Quincey’s most pronounced attack on the Kantian system
comes in an instalment of ‘Autobiography of an English Opium-Eater’,
first published in Tait’s Magazine, June 1836. This sustained assault is
based, ultimately, upon the philosophical despair that Kant’s rejection
of objective knowledge brought to the world:
As often as I looked into his works, I exclaimed in my heart, with
the widowed queen of Carthage, using her words in an altered
application – ‘quaesiuitlucem–ingemuitquerepertaˆ. (Works X, 178)
The Latin here is a quote, or partial quote, from book IV of
Virgil’s Aeneid and the scene of the death of Dido, translated as ‘her
eyes searched for the light – she moaned when they found it’ (Virgil
99). There is, however, a word missing in De Quincey’s ‘altered
application’ – coelo, the heavens. Of course it was necessary to remove
the location of the gaze for the allusion to make sense. But this
removal can give us pause to speculate about the unusual relationship
between Kant, De Quincey, and the Heavens. In abjuring Kant’s
speculative metaphysics, what exactly does De Quincey say of his
physics, of Kant’s own extensive studies of the Heavens and his
Newtonian foundations? The light that emanates from Kant’s work,
leading to De Quincey’s groan, one may consider the false illumination
of reason. Yet, in what follows, I argue that the light from Kant’s work
becomes transformed in ‘System’ into the light that emanates from
the funeral pyre of the phoenix of nature.
De Quincey and Kant on the Cosmos
The beginning of ‘Systems of the Heavens’ starts with reference to
De Quincey’s own translation of Kant’s short essay ‘Die frage, ob
die Erdeverlate, physicalischerwogen’ from 1754, in De Quincey’s
translation ‘Age of the Earth’. This was a very early work of Kant, as was
the majority of his writing on astronomy, and precedes the critical
project by some decades. De Quincey’s reference to it dominates
his engagement with Kant in ‘Systems’, in which he humorously
admonishes Kant for an inappropriate question to be put to our
female planet. Comedy aside, De Quincey’s main points of contention
seem to be: firstly, that Kant mistook the mathematical foundations for
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grasping the age of our fellow planet, Jupiter, and, secondly, that, in
not grasping the planetary structure, Kant had failed to realise that the
earth was full of youthful vigor. The criticism is circuitous – Kant was
too busy trying to systematise a means of ascertaining the age of the
planets to see evidence of growth and expansion in the present:
that the spread of science and technology are indicative of a planet not
in an era of decay, standing on its last legs, uttering an exhausted
‘fin du globe’, but, on the contrary, that entering a period of
unparalleled growth. As De Quincey triumphantly states:
Is it likely, is it plausible, that our Earth should just begin to find
out effective methods of traversing land and sea, when she had a
summons to leave both? Is it not, on the contrary, a clear presumption
that the great career of earthly nations is but on the point of opening,
that life is but just beginning to kindle, when the great obstacles to
effectual locomotion, and therefore to extensive human intercourse, are
first of all beginning to give way? Secondly, I ask peremptorily, – Does it
stand with good sense, is it reasonable that Earth is waning, science
drooping, man looking downward, precisely in that epoch when, first of
all, man’s eye is arming itself for looking effectively into the mighty
depths of space? A new era for the human intellect, upon a path that lies
amongst its most aspiring, is promised, is inaugurated, by Lord Rosse’s
almost awful telescope. (Works XV, 400)
De Quincey’s enthusiasm here is, of course, only rhetorical, and
it is revealed only too soon that Lord Rosse’s telescope provides us
with an abject horror rather than any triumphalism. We could tellingly
compare this passage to the beginning of Suspiria de Profundis,
published 18 months earlier in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine (part I
published in March), in which De Quincey frames the technological
trappings of modernity as destructive of something like a spiritual
experience of the contemplative ‘grandeur which is latent in all men’,
and that this destruction must be met by ‘forces in the direction
of religion or profound philosophy, that shall radiate centrifugally
against this storm of life so perilously centripetal towards the vortex of
the merely human’ (Works XV, 130). Kant’s ‘Transcendental Doctrine
of Judgment’ posited itself as an Island against the illusory nature of
experience – ‘the homeland of truth’ against ‘the wide and stormy
ocean, the true home of illusion’ (Kant Critique 257). Yet, for
De Quincey, it would seem that it was the illusory nature of
transcendental judgment itself that led to an inability to understand
the crisis bequeathed to modern man by that very real storm of
experience. It seems that, for him, the transcendental was incapable
of providing a buffer to real experience, denying us instead those
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forms of spiritual or philosophical contemplation that could make
sense of the infinite horror of true experience.
Robert Platzner argues that what we see in ‘System of the Heavens’
is something akin to a ‘post-Kantian’ sublime in which the experience
of staring into Rosse’s telescope is inherently destructive:
within this system of self-inflicted persecutions one cannot turn towards
the heavens or the phenomenal world at all in hopes of tranquil
restoration. Instead, there is only a post-Kantian “turn” toward
a radicalized sensibility in which the intense feelings aroused by
peering into the Universe through Lord Rosse’s telescope return to
consciousness itself, unable to connect, cognitively or affectively, with the
object world. The rhetoric of sublimity has nothing to adhere to in
a universe in which the imagination moves from “infinite to infinite”;
indeed once the very sense of magnitude has imploded under the weight
of a feeling for infinity, it is no longer possible to encode things or to
incorporate them into a system of renovative reflections. (Platzner 205)
In what follows I will extend Platzner’s reading, suggesting it was the
particular effect transcendental idealism has on experience that so
terrified De Quincey, as it took away both the transformative potential
of experience – as well as the ‘renovative reflections’ that allow us to
deal with it.
Kant’s Newtonian legacy is, I would suggest, underpinning
De Quincey’s rejection of Kant’s thesis on the age of the earth and
his understanding of space more generally. References to Kant’s
Natural History of the Heavens are scattered throughout De Quincey’s
writing, from his early editorials in the Westmoreland Gazette onwards.
These present, in microcosm, De Quincey’s shifting relationship
with the Kantian system. The first instance from September 1819
in the Gazette article ‘Immanuel Kant & Dr Herschel’ is a glowing
endorsement of the Kantian a priori:
[t]wenty-six years at least before Dr Herschel discovered the planet which
bears this name (otherwise called the planet Uranus, and in England
the Georgian planet), it had been predicted – or, to speak more truly,
it had been demonstrated – by Kant that a planet would be found in that
region of the heavens . . . Herschel’s was made empirically, or a posteriori
by means of a fine telescope: Kant’s scientifically or a priori as a deduction
from certain laws which he has established in his Celestial System
(Himmel’s System). (Works I, 167–8)
In August 1830, De Quincey published an essay in Blackwood’s Magazine
entitled ‘Kant in His Miscelleaneous Essays’. In it, he laments the
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lack of space available and claims he would have written an
essay entitled ‘The Natural History of the Heavens’, in which Kant
anticipated much of Herschel’s views on the system of the Universe
(Works VII, 78). In the removed note on Kant from ‘System of the
Heavens’ De Quincey states: ‘Kant, by his “Natural History
of the Heavens”, by his elaborate and polemic essay on the “Living
Forces”, and by other contributions to mathematical physics, had
been obliged to dip into contemporary mathematics’ (Works XV,
626). So it is indubitable that De Quincey knew Kant’s early
work, rather thoroughly if we take him at his word and the stretch
of references over a 25 year period. Yet it is not a simple matter that
De Quincey had taken on board Kant’s early ideas; he is far too
deliberate for that. Instead, I would like to suggest that De Quincey’s
‘System of the Heavens’, can be re-read as a critical engagement
with Kant’s early cosmological writing, and, in particular, the figure
of the phoenix.1
Tracing the Phoenix
If we recall above, De Quincey quoted Virgil on the death of Dido to
express his antipathy towards the Kantian system – gazing into the
heavens, seeking the light, he moaned when he found it. Dido, Queen
of Carthage, was Phoenician in background, and twice in the Aenied is
referred to as ‘Phoenissa’, which Ahl translates as ‘descendent of
Phoenix’ (Virgil 26, 93). It is only coincidental, perhaps, but it was to
be, in ‘System’, the Phoenix of Nature that De Quincey finds when he
gazes into the Kantian Heavens. When lambasting Kant’s process for
approximating the age of the Earth, De Quincey happens on another
possibility:
But suddenly at this point a demur arises upon the total question.
Kant’s very problem explodes, bursts, as poison in Venetian wine
glass of old shivered the glass into fragments ; for is there, after all,
any stationary meaning in the question ? Perhaps, in reality, the earth
is both young and old. Young – if she is not young at present, perhaps
she will be so in future. Old – if she is not old at this moment, perhaps
she has been old, and has a fair chance of becoming so again. In fact,
she is a phoenix that is known to have secret processes for rebuilding
herself out of her own ashes. Little doubt there is but she has seen
many a birth-day, many a funeral night, and many a morning of
resurrection. . . . She recasts her glorious habitations in decomposing
them; she lies down for death, which perhaps a thousand times she
has suffered; she rises for a new birth, which perhaps for the thousandth
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time has glorified her disc. Hers is the wedding garment, hers is
the shroud, that eternally is being woven in the loom. And God
imposes upon her the awful necessity of working for ever at her own
grave, yet of listening for ever to his far-off trumpet of ‘palingenesis’.
(Works XV, 397)
This passage should be compared with the following, from Chapter
Seven of Kant’s Universal History of Nature :
The Phoenix of Nature burns itself up only to return from its ashes, come
back to life and be young again. If we now follow the Phoenix through all
infinity of time and space, and if we see how Nature, even in the aspect of
decay and obsolescence, still has the power for new creations; if we see
how, at the other edge of creation and in the realm of unformed, raw
matter, Nature proceeds with steady steps toward the expansion of the
plan of Divine unfolding and fills all space and time with its miracles – if
we see all this, then the mind, pondering such vistas, will sink into deep
wonder. Yet the mind is discontent with this grandiose object whose
transience can never appease the soul, and wishes to get back to that
very being up close whose understanding and grandeur are the light
source shining through the whole nature as from a centre. (‘Creation’
410–11).
The proximity here between the two statements is too close to be
coincidental. In effect, Kant and De Quincey are using the same
metaphor to deal with the same problem to approximate two very
different solutions. For Kant, the question is how to negotiate between
the idea of transcendental knowledge – that the Universe recreates
infinitely – with empirical knowledge, what we can know of nature. As
De Quiney well knew, the ‘solution’ to this great dilemma would be the
very essence of Kant’s critical project. De Quincey will instead use the
image of the phoenix to dramatise the isolation – the horror – that
results from an attempt to draw together transcendental reason and
empirical experience at the cost of Divine Revelation. In believing that
we have a knowledge of the infinity of creation through scientific
reason, we allow ourselves to enter into a position whereby the infinite
expanse of time and space leaves us feeling adrift in the universe,
forced to listen to the eternal lament of palingenesis. In short, Divine
Revelation is, for De Quincey, a transcendental anchor, a grounding
mechanism that allows us to make sense of experience. Cast free
from that into a process of endless reflection we end up with a
horror of the phoenix, at the mercy of the infinite regresses of time




The phoenix is a fire bird that has a clear relation to the mythic
firebirds of Indian, Syrian, Chinese, Egyptian, and Greek mythology;
yet, as early as 100 A.D., Clement of Rome took the mythic bird as
evidence for the resurrection (Van Den Brock 2–7). The most well-
known early definition comes from Isidore of Seville (560–636), who,
in his Etymologies, described it as:
a bird of Arabia, so called because it possesses a scarlet (phoeniceus) color,
or because it is singular and unique in the entire world, for the Arabs say
phoenix for “singular.” This bird lives more than five hundred years, and
when it sees that it has grown old it constructs a funeral pile for itself of
aromatic twigs it has collected, and, turned to the rays of the sun, with a
beating of its wings it deliberately kindles a fire for itself, and thus it rises
again from its own ashes’. (265)
It is thus a metaphor for resurrection, but, importantly, without
revelation.
The phoenix appears, to my knowledge, on three other occasions
in De Quincey’s body of work. Once, as a rather amusing metaphor for
the human appetite in ‘Dinner, Real and Reputed’, another in the
essay ‘On War’, and, finally, in the concluding section of ‘Suspiria De
Profundis’ entitled ‘The Palimpsest’ – which is of importance here in
confirming its meaning for him as a mechanical image of blind
resurrection. Within that essay, De Quincey is lamenting the ways in
which we have attempted to distort the model of the palimpsest for
understanding the mind: as we have sought to preserve print rather
than allow textual accretion – layers of texts on a single piece of
parchment – over a long period, we now deny the complexities and
contours of mental life. De Quincey then sees the phoenix – a
mechanical, secular, solitary symbol – as adequate to explain the
nature of modernity:
Even the fable of the Phoenix, that secular bird, who propagated his
solitary existence, and his solitary births, along the line of centuries,
through eternal relays of funeral mists, is but a type of what we have done
with Palimpsests. We have backed upon each phoenix in the long
regressus, and forced him to expose his ancestral phoenix, sleeping in the
ashes below his own ashes. (Works XV, 157)
It is crucial here to note that the phoenix is ‘secular’. The word is
usually understood, in common modern usage, through an opposition
to the religious: here the Latin root scul-um is read as pertaining to ‘the
world’ or ‘this world’ as opposed to the divine world of heaven. Yet it
also meant in Latin ‘generation’ or ‘age’, and De Quincey here is
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referring to this meaning of the term, which he takes from Milton’s
Samson Agonistes:
So Virtue, given for lost,
Depressed and overthrown, as seemed,
Like that self-begotten bird,
In the Arabian woods embost,
That no second knows nor third,
And lay erewhile a holocaust
From out her ashy womb now teemed,
Revives, reflourishes, then vigorous most
When most unactive deemed;
And, though her body die, her fame survives,
A secular bird, ages of lives. (l.1689–98)
Samson Agonistes, and, in particular, the image of the phoenix,
have long been a topic of debate in Milton studies. Whether one
chooses to read it as an image of Christian redemption from the
book of Job, or a pagan/secular threat to that very idea, it is an
image on which interpretations of the ‘Dramatic Poem’ rest. (See
Budick.) De Quincey’s version here, and in ‘System’, is playing on
that very tension between the Christian revelation of God in the
form of redemption, and its scientific denial through the idea of
the phoenix as the undead, that which is marked by accretions,
development, according to the laws of nature. Kant’s phoenix is one of
transcendental reason, which De Quincey’s pits against transcendental
revelation.
Kant’s idea of the phoenix-like nature of the earth can also clearly
provide us with links back to the proto-evolutionary Vestiges of the
Natural History of Creation. If the Universe, and the earth along with it,
undergo repeated destruction and resurrection, it mirrors very closely
the arguments mounted by Chambers in his ‘defense’ of Vestiges,
Explanations. Chambers had claimed that Vestiges celebrated rather
than diminished the mysteries of divinity, as it increased through its
analysis: ‘[t]hat great Being, who shall say where is his dwelling-place,
or what his history! Man pauses breathless at the contemplation of a
subject so much above his finite faculties, and only can wonder and
adore!’ (26). Chambers went on in Explanations to clarify that he was
not suggesting a new theory of ‘animate nature’, but a working out of
the ‘LAW’ of revelation (3). The basic proposition is that there is a
system of revelation and it is only now, with the advances in natural
science, that we can grasp the precise manifestations of this law. The
transcendental ‘LAW’ of revelation is, in Explanations, confirmed in
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what is seen through Lord Rosse’s telescope. The experiments of 1845
had arguably challenged Chambers’ hypothesis, yet, in Explanations,
he rejects this, stating that the resolution was ‘expected’ and was of
‘no consequence’ to the nebular hypothesis (9). This was precisely
because the a priori natural law that Chambers had constructed could
account for all phenomena: ‘[t]he wondrous masses which people the
Mighty Void are under the control of natural law. The workings of
the little world of the human mind – the opposite extreme of the
system – are under law likewise. We have thus the character of the
limits of the system fixed’ (26, italics in original). Chambers here is
fundamentally Kantian in his attempt to sketch out a critical
idealism in which a scientific model could account for all. It is
perhaps the importation of this sort of scientism that De Quincey
finds so objectionable. Equally objectionable for De Quincey was any
assertion of an infinite system and structure of eternal return that
underpinned the evolutionary narrative as Chambers conceived it. The
conclusion of Explanations provides a striking image of temporal and
spatial infinite repetition: ‘[t]he vital flame that proceeded from him
[God, the ‘Eternal Author’] at first returns to him in our reflected
form at last, bearing with it all good and lovely things, and making
of all the far-extending Past but one intense Present, glorious
and everlasting’ (188). The everlasting present which concludes
Explanations is another iteration of the phoenix, the eternal
recurrence of a system which contains no outside.
It is worth considering how singular De Quincey’s views were
of Kant’s critical project. While there had long been veiled accusations
that Kant’s system could lead to atheism, De Quincey had, on
numerous occasions, suggested that Kant was ‘the destroyer’ of
Christian hope, and his thought must be rejected accordingly.
His attack in his 1834 article in Tait’s Magazine on Samuel Taylor
Coleridge can stand in as indicative: ‘he had no instincts of creation or
restoration within his Apollyon mind; for he had no love, no faith, no
self-distrust, no humility . . . he exulted in the prospect of absolute and
ultimate annihilation’ (Works X, 299). This attack, while not De
Quincey’s most vituperative, did not pass without comment, and was
the object of an article of rebuke from his friend Nichol in the Glasgow
University Album of 1854. As De Quincey was preparing his collected
works for publication, Nichol thought that this denunciation of
Kant was too intemperate and likely to cause De Quincey some
embarrassment, or harm his future reputation. The short article is a
passionate defense not just of Kant, but of intellectual endeavour
more generally. Nichol argues that De Quincey has, in labelling
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Kant effectively an atheist, accused him of insincerity in more than half
of his body of work, dealing with morals, ethics, practical reason, and
religion. Nichol wants De Quincey to provide evidence that this is
indeed the case, and seems to suggest that De Quincey is content to
devalue German metaphysics over ‘some Scottish preserve’ – most
likely the empiricism of the Scottish Enlightenment (‘Mr De Quincey’
261). Of course, De Quincey can’t be aligned with the thought of
Hume and others in his circle, of whom he was also critical. Yet
Nichol’s meaning is clear: De Quincey wants to retain an idea of
‘experience’ rather than accept the a priori of the ‘Speculative
Faculty’.
Conclusion: the idea of Experience
What is at stake here, then, is the problem of experience. Kant’s
understanding of the cosmology and its infinite nature through the
figure of the phoenix could never have been ‘experienced’ prior to
the arrival of Lord Rosse’s telescope. Kant’s earlier suggestion that the
earth was infinitely destructible and resurrectable is confirmed by
the technologisation of experience. For De Quincey, the advent of an
empirical confirmation of a principal transcendental is a confirmation
of that system itself. So De Quincey’s admonishing of Kant must be
read in this light. De Quincey’s project is one designed to save
experience and those forms of philosophical contemplation that
could account for them, a project which becomes increasingly at odds
with Kant. If, as Stanley Cavell has suggested, Romanticism can be read
as a monitoring of, and particularly dissatisfaction with, the Kantian
settlement, then De Quincey’s attempt to redeem experience is
exemplary of such dissatisfaction (Cavell 31). The Italian philosopher
Giorgio Agamben identifies modernity as characterised by the
destruction of experience. For Agamben, it was the distinction
between ‘the I think, a transcendental subject which cannot be given
substance or psychologized in any way, and the psychological
consciousness of the empirical I’ that Kant bequeathed to modern
experience (32). For Agamben, Kant had to posit the I that knows as
transcendental, unaffected by the I that experiences. The result is that
experience becomes expropriated from the self, or at least those
forms of knowledge that can grasp and make sense of experience.
In ‘System of the Heavens’, it is the empirical subject of experience
gazing up into the truth of the transcendental subject, the phoenix of
nature, that is filled with horror, a horror all the more real because
the two modes of thought can never be brought together again.
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The subject is always destined to suffer the torturous sounds of
the ‘“far-off trumpet of ‘palingenesis’”’, never again to find a
transcendental revelation in which to ground an experience of this
world (Works XV, 397).
Note
1. Robert Lance Snyder has too noticed the unspoken place of Allgemeine Natter
geschickte und Theorie des Himmels in the opening pages of ‘System of the Heavens’,
although he doesn’t explore in any more detail Kant’s own Newtonian position in
relation to the essay. See Snyder.
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